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ARONSON AND ITS PROGENY: LIMITING
DERIVATIVE ACTIONS THROUGH
DEMAND REQUIREMENTS
ANDREW EMERSON*

The shareholder's derivative action has long been recognized as
an "extraordinary remedy" empowering the shareholder to assert
the legal rights of the corporation when the board of directors
wrongfully declines to do so.' The function and value of the deriva-

tive law suit in the preservation of managerial integrity and corporate efficiency has, in recent years, emerged as a focal point of controversy in the legal and business communities." Disagreement has
largely centered around the power which the corporate board should
enjoy vis-a-vis shareholders and courts in controlling the institution
and termination of derivative actions.' More specifically, attention
* B.A., History, with highest honors, Bryan College, 1978; J.D., with honors,
University of Georgia, 1982.
1. Fletcher, ENCYCLOPEDIA OP THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, see 13 W. §§
5939-41.1 (Perm. ed. 1984).
2. Compare Duesenberg, The Business Judgment Rule and ShareholderDerivative Suits: A View from the Inside, 60 WASH. U.LQ. 311, 331 (1982) (suggesting the
derivative lawsuit should not be a principal means of policing directors compliance
with fiduciary duties) [hereinafter cited as The Business Judgment Rule with Dent,
The Power of Directorsto Terminate ShareholderLitigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 96, 96 (1980) ("Shareholders' derivative suits have
long played a crucial role in assuring a modicum of integrity and competence in the
management of corporations") [hereinafter cited as The Death of Derivative Suits).
Defining the role of the derivative lawsuit is merely one issue in an extensive
debate concerning generally the future of corporate governance. Much of the controversy concerns the degree of independence which corporate officers and directors
should enjoy in governing the publicly held corporation. Many of the pertinent issues
are raised in the American Law Institute's Proposed Restatement of Corporate
Goverance. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERANCE

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(DIscussION DRAFT No. 1, 1985); (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985); (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1984);
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE:
RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982). The first draft forthcoming from the American Law Institute met with heavy criticism from the business
community and elicited a response from the prestigious Business Roundtable. STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S "PROPOSED
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMEN-

DATIONS" (1983) [hereinafter cited as STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE]. See

generally Battle Over the Board, DUNS Bus. MONTHLY, Aug. 1983, at 53 (noting the
Business Roundtable's contention that the ALI's initial draft would create inordinate
legal exposure for the corporate director).
3. Compare The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 2, at 341 (the business
judgment rule should insulate the decision of a disinterested minority of directors to
dismiss a derivative action directed against other directors) with The Death of Deriv-
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has focused upon the extent to which the board should retain its
power to compel termination of a derivative action when a majority
of the members of the board are allegedly implicated
in the wrong4
doing which the derivative action seeks to redress.
In recognition of the fundamental tenet that the board of directors is, under normal circumstances, the body vested with power to
assert the legal rights of any corporation,6 state and federal law generally requires the shareholder seeking to institute a derivative lawsuit to make a preliminary demand upon the board. 6 In addition to
preserving the managerial prerogatives of the corporate board, the
demand requirement furthers corporate and judicial efficiency. Resort to intracorporate remedies may redress the perceived wrong to
the corporation, and costly litigation is thereby avoided.7 When confronted with a shareholder's demand, the board is afforded the opportunity to institute litigation, and the board thereby places the
resources of the corporation behind the action.8 The requirement of
a shareholder's demand upon the board also serves the function of
deterring those derivative actions which would result in a waste of
corporate assets.9 Frequently the board of directors will conclude
that the failure to pursue the proposed litigation best serves corporate interests. 0 Similarly, the demand requirement serves as an impediment to the initiation of strike suits, those lawsuits instituted
for the purpose of engendering a substantial fee for a plaintiff's
counsel."
While courts have emphasized the importance and necessity of
a demand upon the board, these same courts have also historically
ative Suits, supra note 2, at 122-23 (the board of directors should never be empowered to terminate a derivative action naming a majority of board members as
defendants).
4. See Comparison of cited authorities supra note 3.
5. See Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a
Derivative Action, 73 HARV. L. REV, 746, 748 (1960).
6. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1.
7. See Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1980); Smachlo v. Birkelo,
575 F. Supp. 1439, 1443 (D. Del. 1983); Evangelist v. Fidelity Management & Research Co., 554 F. Supp. 87, 90 (D. Mass. 1982); Royston v. Eastern Empire Corp.,
393 F. Supp. 1010, 1013 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Comment, The Demand and Standing Requirement in Shareholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 168, 171 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as The Demand and Standing Requirement].
8. See Note, supra note 5, at 749. See Kaster v. Mod. Sys., 731 F.2d 1014, 1017
(2d Cir. 1984); Elfenbein v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., 590 F.2d 445, 450 (2d
Cir. 1978); Brody v. Chemical Bank, 517 F.2d 932, 934 (2d Cir. 1975).
9. See In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 267 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
10. Judicial deference to a board's decision to not pursue the proposed action
has frequently rendered the shareholder powerless to maintain the derivative action.
See Cox, Searching For the Corporation'sVoice in Derivative Suit Litigation:A Critique of Zapata and the ALl Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 961 n.7 (1982).
11. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). See also Note, supra note
5, at 749.

19861

Aronson and Its Progeny

recognized an exception to the demand requirement. Shareholders
seeking to institute a derivative action are excused from making demand when it can be concluded that a request for remedial action
would constitute a futile act. 2 As will be illustrated, courts have
conceived divergent standards for determining whether or not demand is excused on the facts of any particular case."3 Conclusions of
demand futility have, in the vast majority of cases, been premised
upon allegations that the board is rendered incapable of considering
the demand for two reasons. 1 4 First, the board is incapable of considering the demand when the directors have been party to the
wrongdoing that the derivative action seeks to redress. 5 Second, the
board is also rendered incapable of considering the demand because
some adverse influence or interest destroys the board's power to objectively consider the demand.'6
The demand requirement and the concept of demand futility
have taken on new significance as a result of recent developments in
Delaware corporate law. In light of the preeminent role of Delaware,
as the state of incorporation for numerous publicly held corporations, recent pronouncements from the highest court of that state
may significantly impact upon the future of corporate goverance in
America." In recent years, several state and federal courts have recognized that a corporate board, acting through a litigation committee composed of independent directors, retains its power to recommend dismissal of a derivative action even when a majority of the
directors are named as defendants in the lawsuit.18 Significant controversy has been engendered concerning the committee member's
capability, in such a setting, to overcome the natural tendency to
protect the interests of fellow directors and objectively render a decision concerning continuation of the derivative action."9 Further12. See generally text accompanying notes 107-139 infra.
13. In deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 1970)
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that " . . . [c]ourts have generally been
lenient in excusing demand." But see In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d
257, 267 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973) (explicity rejecting such a liberal
approach to the demand requirement).
14. See generally text accompanying notes 107-139 infra.

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Noted corporate law commentator Bayless Manning recently referred to the
Delaware Supreme Court as "the nation's high court of corporate jurisprudence. . . ... Manning, Life in the Board Room After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1, 1
(1985).

18. See Lewis v. Anderson, 165 F.2d 777, 783 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 869 (1980); Rosengarten v. Buckley, 17 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1483 (D. Md.
Jul. 26, 1985); Roberts v. Ala. Power Co., 404 So. 2d 629, 639 (Ala. 1982); Zapata

Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785-86 (Del. 1981); Aurebach v. Bennett, 47
N.Y.S.2d 619, 623-24, 393 N.E.2d 994, 996 (1979).
19. Compare The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 2, at 339-40 (asserting
that a director in such a setting can objectively decide whether or not to pursue de-
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more, judges and commentators alike have differed on the standards
that reviewing courts should employ in determining whether or not
the committee's decision to forego litigation should be honored.20
In May of 1981, the Supreme Court of Delaware in Zapata
1 recognized the power of the duly authorized
Corp. v. Maldonadocorporate board committee to seek dismissal of the shareholder's de22
rivative suit which named a majority of the board as defendants.
The Zapata court did not, however, consider the issue of when it
would be excusable to forego demand on the corporate board as a
prerequisite for the filing of the derivative suit.22 The formulation of

a standard for determinations of demand futility remained a significant issue in the aftermath of Zapata because of the Zapata court's
adoption of the demand requirement as a point of reference for determining the level of judicial scrutiny to be applied by a court reviewing a litigation committee's motion to dismiss a derivative action. 2 ' In the decision of Aronson v. Lewis, 25 the Delaware Supreme
Court resolved this particular issue by framing a two part test for
demand futility premised upon the notion that issues of demand fujudgment rule and the
tility are inextricably linked to the 2 business
8
standards governing its application.

This article will review the recent impact which Aronson has
had on derivative actions arising under Delaware law. Examination
will also be made of the Aronson court's premise that issues of demand futility are best resolved through reference to standards governing application of the business judgment rule. In fashioning this
test for demand futility the Delaware Supreme Court shows an interest in preserving managerial prerogatives in matters relating to
proposed derivative litigation. The adoption of this apparently rigorous test for demand futility may be attributable to the reluctance of
the Delaware Supreme Court to expand a particular strand of judicial intervention into corporate governance suggested earlier by the
Zapata decision. 27 This article further asserts that Aronson's adoprivative litigation against fellow board members) with The Death of Derivative Suits,
supra note 2, at 113-14 (noting "an inherent conflict of interest that arises when directors are asked to pass judgment on fellow directors . . .").
20. Compare Roberts, 404 So.2d 629, 639 (Ala. 1980) and Aurebach, 47
N.Y.S.2d 619, 623-24, 393 N.E.2d 994, 996 (1979) (committee's decision to dismiss
litigation subject to the protection of the business judgment rule) with Zapata, 430
A.2d 779, 787-89 (Del. 1981) (in context of demand futility the committee's motion to
terminate does not prevent a court from engaging in an independent decision concerning whether or not the action should be dismissed).
21. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
22. Id. at 784-85.
23. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 807 (Del. 1984).
24. 430 A.2d at 784. See infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
25. 473 A2d at 805.
26. Id. at 812.
27. For a criticism of the judicial intervention suggested by Zapata, see The
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tion of the business judgment rule as a guide to demand futility is

defective in that demand could be required in situations where it
serves no legitimate purpose.
INSTITUTION OF THE DERIVATIVE ACTION: AN OVERVIEW

In comprehending the relationship of Aronson and Zapata and

the significance of the issues addressed by the respective decisions,
it is beneficial to review the sequence of events preceding institution

of the derivative lawsuit. Prior to filing an action a shareholder must
initially determine whether or not to make a demand upon the
board.2 8 If the plaintiff elects to file a lawsuit without making a pre-

liminary demand, he must plead particularized facts in the complaint as a basis for asserting demand futility. In response to the
initiation of the lawsuit that was not preceded by the filing of a demand, the board will frequently file a motion to dismiss based upon
the plaintiff's failure to make the demand.30 The board may also
appoint a committee to investigate the allegations contained in the
complaint.31 If the court denies the board's motion by concluding

that demand was excused, the board will delegate its power to seek
dismissal of the lawsuit to a special litigation committee composed

of independent directors.82 The committee will undertake an independent investigation of the action which will usually culminate in
Business Judgment Rule, supra note 2, at 342-43.
28. In view of Zapata's pronouncement that when demand is required the business judgment rule insulates from judicial inquiry the board's subsequent motion to
terminate the derivative action, a plaintiff now has a strong incentive to resist making
demand. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.03 comment e (Discussion Draft No. 1, 1985). By making demand, the
shareholder waives any right to argue that demand was futile. Stotland v. GAF Corp.,
469 A.2d 421, 423 (Del. Ch. 1983).
29. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814. The requirement of particularity is established by
Delaware Chancery Court Rule 23.1. For the text of the rule see infra note 108.
30. See, e.g., Haber v. Bell, 465 A.2d 353, 357-59 (Del. Ch. 1983).
31. See Block & Prussin, Termination of Derivative Suits Against Directorson
Business Judgment Grounds:From Zapata to Aronson, 39 Bus. LAW 1503, 1513 n.65
(1984) (hereinafter cited as Termination of Derivative Suits]. The article by Block
and Prussin suggests that under the holding of Abbey v. Computers & Communications Technology Corp., 457 A.2d 368, 374 (Del. Ch. 1983), a board could empower a
committee to merely investigate the derivative suit without waiving demand. Termination of Derivative Suits, supra. However, a board's delegation of authority to the
committee to determine whether or not to seek termination of the derivative action
would, under Abbey, constitute an admission that demand was waived. Id. For a comprehensive review of the Abbey decision, see Comment, Abbey's Modification of
Zapata-A Further Restriction on the Power of Special Litigation Committees: Abbey v. Computer & Communications Technology Corp. 9 DEL. J. CouR. L. 105 (1984).
32. In view of the Abbey decision, the board should not delegate its power to
consider the merits of the derivative action to a litigation committee until a judicial
decision is rendered on the demand issue. See Termination of Derivative Suits,
supra note 31, at 1513 n.65.
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the committee's filing of a motion for dismissal of the action.3 3 The
court will thereafter engage in an independent determination of
whether or not termination of the derivation suit best serves the cor4
porate interests.8
Alternatively, the shareholder initially may elect to make a demand upon the board before instituting the derivative action. In
such a setting the board will, in all likelihood, choose not to delegate
to a special litigation committee its power to act on the demand.35 In
the event that the board fails to act promptly upon the demand or
refuses to institute suit, the shareholder will frequently proceed to
file the derivative suit."6 The court will thereafter rule upon any motion filed by the board seeking dismissal of the action.3 7 A denial by
the court of the board's recommendation for dismissal recognizes
the shareholder's standing to maintain the derivative action.
THE BACKGROUND OF ZAPATA

In concluding that the board of directors' independent committee retains the power to dismiss a derivative action directed against
a majority of the board of directors,38 the Zapata court recognized
the well-established principle that the business judgment rule represents judicial acknowledgment of, and deference to, the expertise of
corporate directors.39 The Zapata decision, however, also recognized
33. See Comment, supra note 31, at 107 n.14; Cox, supra note 10, at 961 n.7.
34. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501 (Del. Ch. 1984).
35. Under the holding of Abbey delegation of the matter to a litigation committee, even when demand had been made, will constitute the board's admission that
demand was futile. Termination of Derivative Suits, supra note 29, at 1513 n.65.
When demand futility is present, a subsequent recommendation for dismissal forthcoming from the board or litigation committee is not insulated from judicial review.
Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 788.
36. See, e.g., Abbey, 457 A.2d at 370.
37. Assuming that demand upon the board was required, the court will simply
determine whether the directors' decision to terminate meets the requirements for
protection under the business judgment rule. Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 787.
38. Id. at 785-86.
39. Id. Defining the purposes underlying the business judgment rule is a critical
factor in determining the extent to which corporate committee decisions to dismiss
derivative litigation against board members should be sheltered from judicial review.
Some legal commentators suggest that the primary function of the business judgment
rule is to immunize directors and officers from liability for their corporate decisions.
See Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a
Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 261, 281 (1981). Adoption of this
view leads to the conclusion that the rule should not prevent a court from overturning a corporate committee's decision to dismiss derivative litigation; the committee
members would not be subject to significant liability by virtue of such judicial action.
Id. at 281-82. Another commentator perceives the business judgment rule not merely
as a device for shielding corporate officials from liability, but suggests that the rule
also precludes the judiciary from undertaking decisions best left to corporate management. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913, 938 (1982) ("By
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the tendency for a corporate director to protect fellow board members' interests and the resulting impact of this tendency on the corporate committee's decisions concerning the pursuit of derivative litigation.40 The director's natural empathy for the fellow board
member who is a target of derivative litigation was stated in the following terms:
Moreover, notwithstanding our conviction that Delaware law entrusts
the corporate power to a properly authorized committee, we must be
mindful that directors are passing judgment on fellow directors in the
same corporation and fellow directors, in this instance, who designated them to serve both as directors and committee directors. The
question naturally arises whether a "there but for the grace of God go
I" empathy might not play a role. And the further question arises
whether inquiry as to independence, good faith and reasonable investigation is sufficient safeguard against abuse, perhaps subconscious
abuse. 4'
The court's reservations, which concerned the ability of a corporate board committee to objectively decide the dismissal of derivative litigation directed against fellow board members, were reflected
in the articulation of standards for a court to apply in reviewing a
committee's motion to dismiss derivative litigation. 42 If the derivative litigant is required to make demand upon the board, the court
merely determines whether the committee's decision to dismiss was
the product of "independence, good faith, and reasonable investigation.'4 The Zapata court, however, proceeded to pronounce a
stricter standard of judicial review for such committee decisions in
the demand futility setting. The court held that when demand upon
the corporate board is excused and a recommendation for dismissal
is forthcoming from the board committee, the court will engage in
an independent inquiry to determine whether dismissal of the derivative action is appropriate."
preventing second-guessing of management's business decisions, the rule serves the
salutory purpose of ensuring that these decisions will be made by those most competent to do so at the lowest cost."). See generally Block & Prussin, The Business
Judgment Rule and ShareholderDerivative Actions: Viva Zapata? 37 Bus. LAW. 27,
38-62 (1981) (reviewing the business judgment rule's evolution from a defensive tool
to an offensive weapon empowering the corporate board to dismiss derivative actions
against directors).
40. See Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 787-89; Cox, supra note 10, at 1009.
41. Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 787.
42. Id. at 787-89.
43. Id. at 787.
44. Id. at 788-89. The court actually engages in a two-step analysis in such a
situation. The court first determines whether the committee was independent, exercised good faith in its decision, and whether a reasonable basis existed for the decision. If the corporation fails to proves these elements, the motion to dismiss is denied.
Id. If the corporation carries its burden of proof on these points, the court proceeds
to the second tier of analysis which allows an independent judicial inquiry into the
correctness of a committee's motion for dismissal. Id. at 789. The Zapata court's creation of a second tier of analysis is largely premised upon the court's recognition of
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The significance of the Delaware Supreme Court's construction
of the demand requirement, as set forth in Aronson, is readily
viewed in the light of Zapata. Under the bifurcated approach of
Zapata,strict judicial scrutiny of committee decisions to dismiss derivative actions is appropriate only when the derivative litigant has
45
been excused from making demand upon the corporate board.
THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF ARONSON

Three years after the Zapata decision, the Delaware Supreme
Court confronted the issue of demand futility as presented in the
factual setting of Aronson. In Aronson, Leo Fink owned forty-seven
percent of the outstanding stock of a Delaware corporation. The
Delaware corporation, named Meyers Parking Systems, was initially
a wholly owned subsidiary of Prudential Building Maintenance Corporation. 4 6 In 1979, Prudential Building distributed its shares in
Meyers Parking to Prudential Building shareholders. 7 Prudential
Building, prior to 1981, had entered into an employment agreement
with Fink.4 8 This agreement provided that Fink would continue as a
consultant to Prudential Building for a ten year period following his
retirement."9 In April 1980, Fink retired, and an agreement was entered into between Meyers Parking and Prudential Building which
provided both corporations would share Fink's consultation services
and Meyers Parking would reimburse Prudential Building for
twenty-five percent of the fees paid to Fink. Pursuant to this agreement, Meyers Parking paid Prudential $48,322 in 1980 and $45,832
in 1981.50
In 1981, the Meyers Parking board approved an agreement with
Fink under which he was to be employed for a five-year period with
an automatic renewal for one-year periods thereafter. Under this
agreement, Fink was to receive a base salary of $150,000 per year
and a bonus of five percent of Meyers Parking's pre-tax profits of
over $2,400,000. Included in this contract was an agreement that
upon termination, Fink would become a consultant for Meyers
Parking and receive compensation of $150,000 yearly for three years,
$125,000 yearly for the following three years, and $100,000 every
year thereafter for life.51 Furthermore, it was agreed that the comthe problem of directorial bias. Id. at 787.
45. Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 787.
46. Lewis v. Aronson, 466 A.2d 375, 379-80 (1983), rev'd and remanded, 473
A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
47. Aronson, 466 A.2d at 379-80.
48. Id.
49. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 805-808.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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pensation would be paid to Fink regardless of any inability on his
part to perform services for Meyers Parking. Fink was, in fact, seventy-five years old at the time of the board's approval of this agreement. Finally, the board of Meyers Parking made interest-free loans
to Fink of $225,000. 5"
Thereafter, a stockholder in Meyers Parking instituted a lawsuit naming the entire board of the corporation as defendants. 53 The
complaint alleged that the board had participated in and approved
the transactions with Fink and that the transactions were wasteful
and had no legitimate business purposes.5 4 The complaint asserted
that demand on the board was futile in view of three factors: (i)
each of the directors had participated in or approved the wrongdoing, (ii) Fink dominated and controlled the board and officers of
Meyers, and (iii) the nature of the allegations required the directors
to sue themselves."
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint asserting the
plaintiff had failed to make the necessary demand on the board. The
trial court concluded that the plaintiff was properly excused from
demand in this instance." In establishing the futility of demand, the
vice chancellor held that the plaintiff "must only allege facts which,
if true, show that there is a reasonable inference that the business
judgment rule is not applicable for purposes of considering a presuit demand pursuant to Rule 23.1.""
On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the court of chancery's denial of a motion to dismiss and articulated a more restrictive test for when demand would be excused.
A court will find that demand is excused if, on the basis of alleged,
particularized facts, "a reasonable doubt is created that: (1) the directors are disinterested and independent and (2) the challenged
transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business
judgment."" On review, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded
that the plaintiffs allegations failed to provide particularized facts
sufficient to fulfill either requirement."
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

In evaluating the Aronson court's adoption of the business judgment rule as a guide in demand futility issues, it is valuable to re52. Id,at 809.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Aronson, 466
Aronson, 473
Id.
Aronson, 466
Id. at 381.
Aronson, 473
Id. at 818.

A.2d at 380.
A.2d at 809.
A.2d at 384-86.
A.2d at 814.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 19:571

view the purposes underlying the business judgment rule and the
requirements that a director or officer must fulfill in order to claim
its protection. An overview of two distinct aspects of the business
judgment rule addressed in recent judicial decisions will thereafter
be presented. First, a review of recent Delaware cases defining the
requisite elements of the business judgment rule and its applicability to various corporate transactions will be undertaken. Thereafter,
consideration will be given to several recent federal cases considering the relationship of the demand requirement and the business
judgment rule.
The business judgment rule is a doctrine of judicial restraint; a
court will not substitute its business judgment for that of corporate
directors nor hold the directors personally liable for those managerial decisions made with due care and in compliance with fiduciary
duties.6 0 The rule implicitly recognizes that the powers of corporate
management are vested in the board of directors and "that court are
ill-equipped to evaluate business judgment decision.""1 In shielding
directors from liability for erroneous business decisions, the rule
serves as an incentive for qualified individuals to assume positions
on the corporate board. 62
The Corporate Director's Guidebook defines the essential components of the business judgment rule in the following terms:
For the Business Judgment Rule to apply, a director must have acted
in good faith, and with a reasonable basis for believing that the action
authorized was in the lawful and legitimate furtherance of the corporation's purposes, and must have exercised his honest business judgment after due consideration of what he reasonably believed to be the
relevant factors. The Business Judgment Rule will not apply in situations where a conflict of interest or other breaches of loyalty are
present."
The business judgment rule has assumed a position of prominence
in current corporate governance debates. 6' Division has arisen
among commentators in both the articulation and interpretation of
the various elements of the rule.6 5 Critics suggest that judicial appli60.
TERPRIsEs

H.

HENN &

J. ALEXANDER,

§ 242 (3d ed. 1983).

LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINEss EN-

61. Sparks, Recent Developments in Substantive Business Judgment Rule, 61
N.C.L.REv. 534, 534 (1983).
62. See Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 93,
97 (1979).
63. 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1604 (1978).
64. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANcE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 & comments (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985).
65. See, e.g., PRINCIPLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 comment f (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985) (justification for "rational belief"
requirement adopted for business judgment rule and contrasted with other standards
such as "reasonable belief" or simply "good faith").
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cation of the standard of care which directors must meet in claiming
the protection of the rule has been historically lax. 66 Disagreements
have also been engendered concerning the extent to which directors
must have deliberately focused upon the decision for which business
judgment protection is sought.67 Recent decisions from the Delaware
Supreme Court have reflected the present struggles surrounding
clarification of the requisite elements of the business judgment
rule.'$ Aronson is but one in a series of recent Delaware cases which
sought to define with greater precision the elements of the business
judgment rule and its application scope. The Aronson decision is
significant not only in its conclusion that issues of demand futility
are "inextricably bound to issues of business judgment and the standards governing its application," but also in its articulation of the
standard of directorial care incorporated in the business judgment
rule. 9 The court concluded that directors' liability is predicated
upon the standard of gross negligence as opposed to "simple negligence. '7 0 While this pronouncement concerning the standard of care
suggested that the business judgment protection afforded directors
is quite extensive, the court cautiously noted that in order to enjoy
such protection the directors must "inform themselves prior to making a business decision,
of all material information reasonably avail1
able to them.

7

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT IN DELAWARE BUSINESS JUDGMENT: VAN
GORKOM AND BEYOND

In the aftermath of Aronson the Supreme Court of Delaware
further clarified the contours of the business judgment rule in Smith
v. Van Gorkom.72 In Van Gorkom a shareholder of the Trans Union
Corporation brought a class action suit against directors of the company challenging their approval of a cash out merger. 78 The Trans
Union board approved the merger, which the corporation's chief executive officer had orally proposed, after a meeting which lasted approximately two hours.74 Despite the distinguished credentials of the
directors of the Trans Union board 7 5 the court rejected the direc66. See, e.g., Cary, Federalismand CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663, 683 (1974).
67. See STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESs RoUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 48-49.
68. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 & n.6 (liability under Delaware business
judgment rule is predicated on the standard of gross negligence).

69. Id. at 812.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
guished

Id. at 812 n.6.
Id. at 812.
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
Id. at 863.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 880. The dissenting opinion of Justice McNeilly sets forth the distinbusiness credentials of the various board members. Id. at 894 (McNeilly, J.,
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tors' contention that the business judgment rule protected the
merger approval.76 In concluding that the board did not reach an
informed business decision, the court emphasized that the board
members were given no documentation to support the adequacy of
the sale price, and the court also emphasized that the board members failed to make reasonable inquiries on the officers who had pro77
posed the sale and who had prepared a preliminary study.
The Van Gorkom decision stirred the legal and business communities by suggesting that Delaware courts would not as readily
defer to the decisions of a corporate board. One commentator perceived Van Gorkom as a departure from Delaware's historic jurisprudence of business judgment, and criticized the decision as an unjustified limitation on business judgment protection. 8 Its impact on
the future development of the Delaware business judgment rule remains somewhat uncertain. 7 At a minimum Van Gorkom is a warn-

ing to the business community that to claim business judgment protection in the context of certain major corporate transactions,
directors will be required to demonstrate that they have consulted
with financial experts and corporate management and that they
have reviewed key documents to an extent sufficient to justify a conclusion that their subsequent decisions were truly "informed."80 Van
Gorkom may, therefore, be indicative of an evolution in Delaware's
business judgment rule. 1
dissenting).
76. Id. at 874.
77. Id. at 874-75.
78. See generally Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union
Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437 (1985).
79. Perhaps the most viable interpretation of the court's pronouncements in
Van Gorkom is that the decision simply prescribes a methodology which directors
should adhere to in approving major corporate transactions. See Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW
1, 3 (1985) [hereinafter cited as PracticalTips on Life in the Boardroom]. For example, in approving cash out mergers, board members should preliminarily consult with
an investment banker and be provided with copies of the merger agreement for review. Id. at 8-9. This "procedural" interpretation of Van Gorkom is substantiated by
the court's subsequent decisions in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946 (1985) and Moran v. Household International, Inc. No. 37, 1985 (Del. Nov. 19,
1985). In both decisions business judgment protection was extended to anti-takeover
actions taken by corporate boards. See, e.g., Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950-51. See also
Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1985).
80. See Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom, supra note 79, at 6-14.
81. One commentator has recently noted the "striking and rapidly developing
changes in the substantive corporation law of the duty of care, the duty of loyalty,
and the business judgment rule in the context of major business transactions." Veasey, FurtherReflections on Court Review of Judgments of Directors:Is the Judicial
Process Under Control? 40 Bus. LAW. 1373, 1373 (1985). It should be noted, however,
that another commentator, while observing the recent erratic development in Delaware's business judgment rule, suggests that Van Gorkom "can be fitted ... into the
mainstream of business judgment rule jurisprudence." PracticalTips on Life in the
Boardroom, supra note 79, at 4.
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Two other recent Delaware cases construing the applicational
parameters of the business judgment are noteworthy. In Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Company,' the board of directors of Unocal, in response to a hostile tender offer made by minority shareholder Mesa Petroleum Company, approved Unocal's self-tender offer for its own stock.88 The lower court initially enjoined the
exchange offer which excluded Mesa.$' In assessing whether the action of the Unocal board was subject to the protection of the business judgment rule, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that the directors contemplated the purchase of shares with corporate funds. 8
In view of this proposed action, the court was required to initially
determine whether the directors "had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of another person's stock ownership." ' A showing of good
faith and reasonable investigation on the part of the board fulfilled
this burden.8 7 Furthermore, the partial tender offer constituted a
reasonable response to the threat that Mesa posed. 8 The court
found that the board decision fell within the protection of the business judgment rule despite the fact that the plan was expeditiously
adopted in the course of meetings held only two days apart."
More recently, in Moran v. Household International,Inc.," the
Supreme Court of Delaware held that a board's adoption of a Preferred Share Purchase Rights Plan as an anti-takeover device was
subject to the protection of the business judgment rule. 1 Under the
Rights Plan the Household shareholders were entitled to the issuance of one right per common share in the event that either a tender
offer for thirty percent of the outstanding stock was made or if a
single entity purchased twenty percent or more of Household's
stock. 9" The court initially found the board was authorized under
82. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
83. Id. at 950-51.
84. Id. at 952.
85. Id. at 955. The court initially determined that the board had authority
under Delaware law to adopt such a defensive measure even though it required the

board to
86.
87.
88.
89.

deal selectively with shareholders of the corporation. Id.
Id.
Id. at 954-55.
Id. at 950-51, 955.
Id.

90. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., No. 37, 1985 (Del. Nov. 19, 1985) (available
on LExIS).
91. Id.
92. The court described the workings of the plan in the following terms:
If an announcement of a tender offer for 30 percent of Household's shares

is made, the Rights are issued and are immediately exercisable to purchase 1/
100 share of new preferred stock for $100 and are redeemable by the Board for
$.50 per Right. If 20 percent of Household's shares are acquired by anyone, the
Rights are issued and become non-redeemable and are exercisable to purchase
1/100 of a share of preferred. If a right is not exercised for preferred, and
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Delaware law to adopt such a plan.98 Applying the principles enunciated in Unocal, the court held that the plan was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed."" The court further concluded that in contrast to the Van Gorkom setting, the directors' adoption of the plan
constituted an informed business decision.9 5 The directors were provided with notebooks summarizing the plan, and the directors fully
discussed the defensive measures with the attorneys and the investment brokers who formulated the plan."6 The decisions in Unocal
and Moran can be collectively viewed as fortunate sequels to Van
Gorkom. Specifically, they suggest that corporate boards, in adopting anti-takeover devices, are conforming to the methodological prescriptions articulated by the court in Van Gorkom. 97 Furthermore,
they intimate that Van Gorkom may not constitute a significant
limitation upon the extensive protection enjoyed by directors under
the Delaware business judgment rule.
EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
AND THE DEMAND REQUIREMENT

Consideration of the interrelationship of the business judgment
rule and the demand requirement did not originate with Aronson.9 8
A review of selected federal decisions manifests divergent pronouncements concerning the correlation of business judgment and
demand futility.99 In its 1973 decision of In re Kauffman Mutual
Fund Actions,100 the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit rejected the notion that the directors' approval of a transaction alleged to have caused injury to the corporation established demand futility. In dismissing the contention that such allegations established demand futility, Judge Aldrich made these observations:
Where mere approval of the corporate action, absent self-interest or
other indication of bias, is the sole basis for establishing the directors'
"wrongdoing" and hence for excusing demand on them, plaintiff's suit
should ordinarily be dismissed.
thereafter, a merger of consolidation occurs, the rights holder can exercise each
Right to purchase $200 of the common stock of the tender offeror for $100.
This "flip-over" provision of the Rights Plan is at the heart of this controversy.

Id.
93.
94.

95.
96.
97.
Life in
98.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
For articulation of the methodology of Van Gorkom, see Practical Tips on
the Boardroom, supra note 79, at 8-14.
See Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 785-86 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.

880 (1982); Haber v. Bell, 465 A.2d 353, 357 (Del. Ch. 1983).

99. Compare Lewis, 671 F.2d at 785-86 (business judgment test for demand futility deemed appropriate), with Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977)
(considerations of business judgment protection deemed relevant to demand issue).
100.

479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
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.. . In this respect, the nature of the alleged misconduct must be
considered. Logic suggests a sharp distinction between a transaction
completely undirected to a corporate purpose and one which, while
perhaps vulnerable to criticism, is of a character that could be thought
to serve the interest of the corporation.101
Kauffman indicated that a relevant factor in the determination
of demand futility was whether the directors' approval of the transaction which formed the basis of the derivative action was subject to
the protection of the business judgment rule. 0 2 In the subsequent
decision of Heit v. Baird,103 the plaintiff asserted that demand futility was present because the greater part of the present board of directors had approved the alleged wrongful transaction. In rejecting
this contention, the court in Heit again placed heavy reliance on the
potential applicability of the business judgment rule to the transaction which formed the basis of the lawsuit:
In the absence of more particularized allegations indicating such gross
inadequacy in the consideration as to manifest an abuse of the directors' power to set a price for the stock, the complaint cannot be read
as alleging more than "an erroneous business judgment in connection
with what was plainly a corporate act, if that.".

. .

. An allegation of

the latter sort would be1 4insufficient to excuse a failure to make a demand on the directors.

0

In Lewis v. Curtis0 5 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit examined, and explicitly rejected, the First Circuit's
application of the business judgment rule to issues of demand
futility:
We do not think that, to excuse demand, plaintiff must allege that the
transaction could not under any circumstances ultimately be considered the product of business judgment. Rather, the court, in determining whether demand is necessary, should consider whether a demand on the directors would be likely to prod them to correct a
wrong.'"
ANALYSIS OF DEMAND FUTILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF ARONSON

The Aronson court's rejection of the plaintiff's three bases for
demand futility provides a convenient framework for a general discussion of certain Delaware and federal judicial applications of the
101. Id. at 265.
102. Id.
103. 567 F.2d 1157, 1160-62 (1st Cir. 1977).
104. Id. at 1162.
105. 671 F.2d 779 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
106. Id. at 786. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the earlier decision of
Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. National Bank & Trust, 518 F.2d 873, 877-78 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976), similarly rejected the concept of business
judgment as being relevant to determinations of demand futility.
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demand requirement. The Aronson court 0' noted the similarity of
Rule 23.1 of the Delaware Chancery and Rule 23.1 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 8 In view of that similarity, a review of
federal decisions is valuable in analyzing the demand futility test
formulated in Aronson.' °s The least persuasive ground for demand
futility that the shareholders in Aronson had asserted was the fact
that the institution of the suit would require the directors to sue
themselves.1 10 The court dismissed the argument noting that acceptance of such logic "would effectively abrogate Rule 23.1 and weaken
the managerial power of the directors." ' The court's rejection of
such an assertion of demand futility is correct. Plaintiffs could otherwise regularly circumvent the demand requirement by simply
naming a majority of the board as defendants.11 ' The part filing a
derivative action would be generally absolved of the duty to plead
particularized facts indicating the futility of demand.
A more plausible argument for demand futility in Aronson is
found in the plaintiff's allegation that Fink dominated and controlled every member of the board and every officer of Meyers Parking.118 The court refused to conclude that such control was established merely by Fink's ownership of forty-seven per cent of the
outstanding stock.' 1 4 Election or nomination of a director by one
controlling the outcome of the election was not deemed sufficient to
107. Aronson, 473 A.3d at 808 n.1.
108. Delaware Chancery Rule 23.1 provides in pertinent part:
In a derivative action brought by 1 or more shareholders or members to
enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be
asserted by it, the complaint shall allege that the plaintiff was a shareholder or
member at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share
of membership thereafter devolved on him by operation of law. The complaint
shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to
obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and
the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.
(Emphasis added).
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 808 n.1.
109. Federal courts frequently are called upon to resolve issues of demand futility. See Kaster v. Modification Systems, 731 F.2d 1014, 1017-18 (2d Cir. 1984); Lewis
v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 247-50 (2d Cir. 1983); Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 785-86
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions,
479 F.2d 257, 263-65 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973); Reilly Mortg. Group
v. Mt. Vernon Say. & Loan Ass'n, 568 F. Supp. 1067, 1075-78 (E.D. Va. 1983); Gen.
Elect. Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 563 F. Supp. 970, 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Clark Enterprises Inc. v. Holywell Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1308, 1310-12 (E.D. Va. 1983); Brick v.
Dominion Mortgage & Realty Trust, 442 F. Supp. 283, 293-96 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 813.15 (D. Colo. 1968), modified,
435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
110. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 818.
111. Id.
112. See Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983).
113. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815.
114. Id.
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establish domination. 1 6 The shareholder "must allege particularized
facts manifesting 'a direction of corporate conduct in such a way as
to comport with the wishes or interests of the corporation (or persons) doing the controlling.'

"116

Derivative litigants frequently have used, as a basis for asserting demand futility, allegations of board domination by a shareholder who owned a significant portion of the corporation's outstanding stock.1 1 7 The divergency of views over the facts which will
justify a conclusion of "domination or control" is manifested in recent federal decisions. In Kaster v. Modification Systems," 8 for instance, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a conclusion of
demand futility despite the fact that a defendant both had owned
seventy-one percent of the corporation's outstanding shares and had
nominated all but one of the corporate board's members. 19
In contrast to the stringent application of the demand requirement in Kaster, a federal district court in Abbe v. Goss120 concluded
that demand futility was established by virtue of the fact that a defendant and his family owned forty-four percent of the corporation's
common stock.' The Aronson court's conclusion that Fink's stock
ownership did not establish domination and control finds support in
the earlier Delaware Chancery court decision of Kaplan v.Centex
Corp.

The court in Kaplan held that an individual's ownership of

23
less than a majority of corporate shares does not establish control.
The existence of an alleged wrongdoer who owns a substantial
percentage of outstanding stock presents one of the more difficult
settings for resolving whether or not demand is required. When the
defendant owns sufficient stock to elect a majority of the board
members there are compelling justifications for a conclusion of demand futility. It is a fair inference that the board would comply
with the shareholder's wishes.' 24 Nevertheless, Aronson's additional
requirement of alleged facts indicating that directors have complied
with the wishes of the shareholder is quite defensible. Election of a
board member by an alleged wrongdoer does not conclusively establish that the director is incapable of independent action on behalf of

115. Id. at 816.
116. Id. (quoting Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 123 (Del. Ch. 1971)).
117. See, e.g., Kaster v. Modification Systems, 731 F.2d 1014, 1019 (2d Cir.
1984); Clark v. Lomas & Netleton Fin. Corp. 625 F.2d 49, 53 (5th Cir. 1980); cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981); Clark Enterprises, Inc. v. Holywell, 559 F. Supp. 1307,
1309-12 (E.D. Va. 1983); McKee v. Rogers, 18 Del. Ch. 81, 156 A. 191, 192-93 (1931).
118. 731 F.2d 1014 (2d Cir. 1984).

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 1019.
411 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Id. at 924-25.
284 A.2d 119 (Del. Ch. 1971).
Id. at 122-23.

124. Abbe, 411. F. Supp. at 924-25.
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the corporation.128 Determination of whether the director is more

than the "alter ego" of the controlling shareholder is best made on a
case by case basis through examination of the director's past course
of conduct in corporate matters which directly affect the interest of
the shareholder.126
The plaintiff in Aronson also asserted that demand futility was
established because the directors "expressly approved and/or acquiesced in, and are personally liable for, the wrongs complained
of. .. "I" Directors' participation in alleged wrongdoing has fre-

quently formed the basis for conclusions of demand futility in both
Delaware and federal decisions.128 Directors engaged in conduct injurious to the corporation are deemed incapable of either investigat-

ing allegations of such wrongdoing or instituting a lawsuit against
themselves. 2 The applicability of this uniformly accepted principle
to particular factual settings necessarily depends upon a court's conclusions concerning the level of directorial participation in an alleg-

edly wrongful transaction which necessarily destroys the board
member's ability to subsequently act upon a shareholder's demand
for remedial action.130 When a director is engaged in self-dealing or
knowingly participates in a scheme to defraud the corporation,
clearly he should be deemed incapable of acting upon a subsequent

demand.'" A review of several Delaware cases finding demand futility on the basis of directorial wrongdoing suggests that the directors
were

knowing
132

participants

in

the

alleged

wrongs

to

the

corporation.
A different issue is present when it is alleged that directors
125. See Kaster, 731 F.2d at 1020 (suggesting the director will frequently have
other motivations for resisting control of the dominant shareholders such as a threat
of personal liability or protection of a personal interest in stock of the corporation).
126. See The Demand and Standing Requirement, supra note 7, at 174. Admittedly, this is impossible in the case of newly elected board members.
127. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 809.
128. See, e.g, Reilly Mortg. Group v. Mount Vernon Say. & Loan Ass'n, 568 F.
Supp. 1067, 1076 (E.D. Va. 1983); Dann v. Chrysler Corp. 140 Del. Ch. 103, 174 A.2d
696, 700 (1961).
129. Dann, 140 Del. Ch. 103, 174 A.2d at 700.
130. See The Demand and Standing Requirement, supra note 7, at 176 (noting
split among courts on issue of whether directors' passive participation or acquiescence
in alleged wrongdoing is sufficient to excuse demand).
131. See The Demand and Standing Requirement, supra note 7, at 179-80.
132. See Miller v. Loft Inc., 17 Del. Ch. 301, 153 A. 861, 862 (Del. Ch. 1931)
(demand futility not established with regard to board, but statements of court support conclusion asserted in text); Sohland v. Baker, 15 Del. Ch. 84, 141 A. 277, 282
(1927) (self dealing by corporate officer with board approval); Fleer v. Frank H. Fleer
Corp. 114 Del. Ch. 282, 125 A. 411, 414 (1924) (two of four directors alleged to have
"wrongfully secured the corporate stock and captured the corporation to the exclusion of the majority"); but see Dann, 140 Del. Ch. 103, 174 A.2d at 700 (passive participation of directors in a wrongful transaction is sufficient to excuse demand even
where the directors are merely guilty of gross negligence as opposed to being knowing
participants).
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merely approved or acquiesced in the wrongs. Allegations of a director's approval or acquiescence in a wrongful transaction should not
form the basis for a conclusion of demand futility."' Since directors
must necessarily approve all major corporate transactions, recognition of such a basis for demand futility would render the demand
requirement a virtual nullity.5 4 The Aronson court rejected the directors' approval of the agreements with Fink as a basis for demand
futility, and the court noted that: "In Delaware mere directorial approval of a transaction, absent particularized facts supporting a
breach of fiduciary duty claim, or otherwise establishing the lack of
independence or disinterestedness of a majority of the directors, is
insufficient to excuse demand."1 5
While correctly concluding that the board's mere approval of
the compensation agreements with Fink did not establish demand
futility, the Aronson court's adoption of the business judgment rule
as a guide to demand futility is nevertheless disturbing. As is noted
in the conclusion to this article, the court's linking of the business
judgment rule with the demand requirement suggests that a board's
mere approval or aquiescence in a wrongful transaction could conceivably form the basis for a conclusion of demand futility.136 Such a
result could be premised upon a plaintiffs pleading of particularized
facts which would indicate that the board's approval of the transac13 7
tion was the product of gross negligence.
One final justification for demand futility which the plaintiff in
Aronson did not assert merits attention. One noted commentator
has suggested that demand should be excused when a clear conflict
of interests impairs the board's ability to consider the demand.'"
The first prong of the Aronson demand test, which focuses upon the
independence and disinterestedness of the board, contemplates such
a basis for demand futility. Subsequent review of cases which have
applied the Aronson test will indicate that alleged conflicts of interest may frequently provide a basis for excusing demand. 3 9
133. See The Demand and Standing Requirement, supra note 7, at 178-80
(noting directors frequently retain an impetus to take remedial measures after
aquiescing in a wrong); see also H.M. Greenspun v. Del E. Webb Corp., 634 F.2d
1204, 1213 (9th Cir. 1980).
134. See The Demand and Standing Requirement, supra note 7, at 179.
135. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 817. The court also rejected this as a basis for demand futility because the plaintiff failed to allege particularized facts indicating that
the transactions entered into with Fink constituted wrongs to the corporation. Id.
136. See infra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
138. See The Demand and Standing Requirement, supra note 7, at 174-75.
139. See infra notes 140-64 and accompanying text.
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SUBSEQUENT APPLICATION OF ARONSON'S DEMAND FUTILITY TEST

A review of six recent cases which have applied the test for demand futility articulated in Aronson suggests that the derivative litigant has retained a difficult burden'in establishing demand futility.
In view of the overriding importance of particularized facts in the
resolution of demand issues, the plaintiffs allegations in each case
will be recounted in detail.
Allegations of Directors' Interest in the Challenged Transactions:
Anti-takeover Transactions
Three of the cases which applied the Aronson test have involved challenges to a board's implementation of an anti-takeover
1 40
device or its rejection of a tender offer. In Good v. Texaco, Inc.,
the plaintiff filed a derivative suit which alleged that the company
wasted corporate assets when it purchased 25 million shares of outstanding stock.14 1 The shareholder alleged that Texaco's board of directors approved both the company's purchase of 13 million shares
of stock and the exchange of preferred stock for 12 million shares of
common stock.142 Through the exchange agreement, Texaco's board
allegedly controlled the voting rights over the preferred shares exchanged.1 48 The complaint further charged that the Texaco board
repurchased the common stock at a twelve percent premium over
prevailing market prices.14' The plaintiff also alleged that Texaco's
management sought amendments to the certificate of incorporation
140. 16 SEc. REG. & L. REP. 979 (BNA) (Del. Ch. June 1, 1984). It should be
noted that aside from Good, this survey of Aronson's application is based upon a
review of reported cases. Other applications of Aronson may be found in unreported
decisions not herein reviewed.
141. Id. Texaco repurchased the shares of Bass Brothers in order to fend off
takeover attempts by Bass. Id. The Bass Brothers began acquiring Texaco stock in
1982 and had acquired 9.9 per cent of Texaco's outstanding shares by January of
1984. Good v. Texaco Inc., slip. op. No. 7501 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 1985) (decision approving settlement of the case). Bass Brothers dramatically increased their acquisition of stock in the aftermath of Texaco's agreement to acquire ownership of Getty
Oil Company. Id. The Good case concluded with a settlement including Texaco's payment of plaintiff's attorneys' fees in the amount of $700,000. Id.
142. Good v. Texaco, Inc., 16 SEc. REG. & L. REP. at 979 (BNA) (Del. Ch. June
1, 1984).
143. Id. Subsequent to the filing of the Good lawsuit, Texaco's board modified
the repurchase agreement with Bass on May 17, 1984. Good v. Texaco Inc., slip. op.
No. 7501 (Del. Feb. 19, 1985). By virtue of the modification, Texaco gave up the right
to control the votes on the 12.6 million preferred shares. Id. In approving the settlement of the case, the vice chancellor noted that through discovery, plaintiffs attorneys were persuaded that Texaco's repurchase was protected by the business judgment rule. The only remedy that plaintiffs' believed they could obtain was
modification of the original voting rights agreement on the preferred shares-an issue
rendered moot by the modification agreement. Id.
144. Good v. Texaco, Inc., 16 Ssc. REG. & L. REP. 979 (BNA) (Del. Ch. June 1,
1984).
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which would require an eighty percent vote of Texaco shareholders
to either remove directors from office or to approve certain business
combinations not otherwise sanctioned by the board of directors. 45
The Good court found the plaintiff's allegations sufficient to
support a conclusion of demand futility under the standard of Aronson."16 The complaint indicated that the board had, at corporate expense, acquired the right to control the vote of five percent of Texaco's outstanding shares. 1 7 The Good court noted that the board's
acquired voting rights could be used in seeking passage of the proposed amendments.14 The plaintiff's allegations concerning the
board's purchase of shares, when coupled with the board's proposed
amendments, created a reasonable doubt concerning the disinterestedness of the board members.1 49 Specifically, the complaint indicated that all of the directors retained an interest in the transaction
because they had acquired, at corporate expense, the right to vote
certain shares which they did not own.'50
The conclusion of demand futility in the Good case is the correct one. While demand should not necessarily be deemed futile
whenever a board seeks to shield the corporation from a hostile
takeover, the alleged purchase of the shares at a premium price,
when viewed in conjunction with the proposed amendments, raised
a clear doubt about the board's disinterestedness. Also noteworthy
in the resolution of the demand issue was the vice chancellor's refusal to consider any of the plaintiff's proffered facts other than
those contained in the complaint."15 Good thereby reaffirms the
overwhelming importance of specific pleading for the plaintiff seeking a finding of demand futility. Omissions in the plaintiff's pleadings which undermine his claim of demand futility will not be subject to rehabilitation through discovery or affidavits.15
In Moran v. Household International,Inc., 5 3 a Delaware Chancery Court also resolved a demand futility issue. The Moran court
Id.
146. Id.
145.

147.
148.
149.

Id.

Id.
Id.

150. Id.
151. Id. The plaintiff argued that the Texaco directors retained an interest in
the challenged transactions because they wanted "to preserve their lucrative compen-

sation and benefits of office in disregard of the interests of Texaco and its public
shareholders." Id.
152. Id.

153. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch. 1985), af'd, slip.
op. No. 37, 1985 (Del. Nov. 19, 1985). For a review of the factual setting of the Moran
case and the Delaware Supreme Court's holding in this matter see supra notes 90-96
and accompanying text. While the Delaware Chancery Court found demand futile in
the Moran case, the Supreme Court did not address the issue on appeal but focused
only upon the power of the board to adopt the preferred rights plan and the applies-
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applied the Aronson test and concluded that demand was excused
because the plaintiff's allegations indicated that the preferred stock
rights plan prevented all takeover bids and thereby entrenched the
directors in their offices.1 ' This fact was deemed to create a reasonable doubt as to the disinterestedness and independence of the
board. 15
In Pogostin v. Rice," 6 the stockholder's derivative action
charged that the board of directors of City Investing Company
wrongfully rejected a tender offer for corporate shares resulting in a
substantial loss of value for shareholders.1 5 In Pogostin it was further alleged that the increase in market price for the corporation's
shares, which resulted from the tender offer, provided excessive payments to four officers and directors under compensation plans keyed
to market price.15 8 The court rejected the contention that the
board's ratification of the compensation plan met Aronson's standard of demand futility because in Pogostin a majority of disinterested directors had adopted the plan, the shareholders had ratified
it, and a committee of four disinterested directors had administered
it.1" Absent "actual fraud," directors' judgments concerning the
consideration for stock options and compensation plans are conclusive.160 Furthermore, the board's rejection of the tender offer did not
establish demand futility because the plaintiff failed to allege facts
indicating that the board members' desire to perpetuate themselves
in office had primarily motivated the rejection. 6' Nor were facts alleged to indicate that the rejection was the product of gross negligence; the board's decision appeared to be the product of careful,
informed consideration. 1 "

The divergent conclusions concerning demand futility reached
in Moran and Pogostin are readily distinguishable. The shareholder's allegations in Moran that the rights plan deterred all takeover attempts created a reasonable doubt concerning the directors'
disinterestedness and independence. In contrast, the mere rejection
of a tender offer in Pogostin did not as strongly suggest that the
desire to retain control had motivated the directors.' The Moran
and Pogostin decisions illustrate the intense factual inquiry accombility of the business judgment rule to the board's actions. Moran v. Household Int'l,
Inc., No. 37, 1985 (Del. Nov. 19, 1985).
154. Moran, 490 A.2d at 1071.
155. Id.
156. 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984).

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 622.
Id. at 623.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 625.
Id. at 627.
Id.
See Moran, 490 A.2d at 1071.
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panying decisions of demand futility. The chancery court decisions
in Good and Moran suggest that the implementation of anti-takeover devices by corporate boards will provide factual settings particularly ripe for a conclusion of demand futility.'"
Directors' Approval of Transactions With Management Personnel
Aronson foreshadowed issues of demand futility which have
also arisen in the context of derivative suits which challenged various boards' approvals of corporate transactions entered into with
present or former corporate officers.'"5 In Kaufman v. Belmont,'"
for example, a shareholder filed a derivative action charging directors with unlawfully permitting officers of the Phillip A. Hunt
Chemical Corporation to make substantial profits through the
board's cancellation of the officers' stock options. 16 7 The complaint
alleged that in connection with a tender offer made for fifty-one per
cent of the corporation's common stock, the directors cancelled the
stock options enabling the officers to receive the difference between
the tender price and the option price.'" Four directors on the board
were designees of the tender offeror, Turner & Newell Industries.'"
The plaintiff advanced a number of grounds for demand futility, all
but one of which the court systematically rejected. The court initially refused to find that demand futility was established merely
because the four directors designated by Turner acquiesced in and
refused to attack the stock option cancellations which had occurred
before they became directors.170 The vice chancellor also rejected the
conclusion that these four directors were disqualified from acting on
the demand merely because Turner nominated them; no facts were
pled suggesting that Turner had instructed these directors to reject
the demand.'17 Similarly dismissed was the argument that one director was rendered incapable of acting on the demand merely because
the eight other directors had selected him.7 2 While certain personal
gains realized from the cancellations clearly disqualified two directors, the court rejected as "pure hyperbole" the charge that a voting
164. In determining whether a reasonable doubt is created concerning the
board's disinterestedness in adopting an anti-takeover device or rejecting a tender
offer, the court will apply a "primary purpose" test. 480 A.2d at 627. If the board's
sole or primary purpose was to perpetuate itself in office, then demand will be
deemed futile. Id.
165. The Pogostin case, as previously noted, included a challenge to the compensation scheme adopted for directors. Id. at 623.
166. 479 A.2d 282 (Del. Ch. 1984).
167. Id. at 284.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 287.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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conspiracy existed between these two and certain other directors.1 73
No facts were pled to substantiate the conclusion that a conspiracy
existed.17 ' Following in the wake of Aronson, the analysis of Kaufman again suggests that Delaware courts will continue to rigorously
enforce the "particularized fact" requirement in applying the business judgment test for demand futility. The plaintiff will be frequently unable to meet this burden because of his inability to conduct discovery in connection with the claim of demand futility.
In Tabas v. Mullane1

7

5 shareholders of Bally Manufacturing
Corporation filed a derivative action against officers and directors of
the corporation alleging that they breached a fiduciary duty and
wasted corporate assets through certain agreements entered into
with a former corporate president. 17 6 Specifically, the shareholders
challenged the following transactions: (1) Bally's purchase of the
former president's stock at a twenty percent premium over market
price; (2) a five year extension of the president's employment agreement despite the fact that the New Jersey Casino Control Commission was investigating him; (3) a payment of $2,112,000 in settlement of claims subsequent to the president's resignation; (4)
payment of $1.9 million to a partnership, in which the president had
an interest, for the purchase of premises which had formerly housed
the corporate headquarters; and (5) payment of7 7$292,000 as a lease
termination charge on the purchased premises.

Predictably, the court rejected the shareholders' contention that
demand futility was established merely because the directors would
be required to initiate suit against themselves.17 8 Furthermore, the
particular facts of the land purchase, lease termination, and employment agreement were deemed insufficient to create a reasonable
doubt about the board's protection under the business judgment
rule.179 Only the circumstances surrounding the purchase of the former president's shares at a twenty percent premium above the market price were deemed sufficiently suspect to challenge the director's
business judgment and thereby excuse demand.16 0 The court's analy173. Id. at 288. These two interested directors received $123,017 each from the
cancellation of their options. Id.
174. Id.
175. 608 F. Supp. 759 (D. N.J. 1985).
176. Id. at 761.
177. Id. at 760-61.

178. Id. at 766.
179. Id. at 769-72.
180. Id. at 768-69. The court noted that plaintiff specifically alleged the corporation did not have to buy the stock from O'Donnell, the former president, as he was

ordered to divest it by the New Jersey Casino Control Commission. Id. at 768. Plaintiff further alleged there was a ready market for Bally stock to accommodate the
divestiture. Id. Furthermore, the complaint charged that the directors forced the corporation to buy back the shares to circumvent a by-law prohibiting Bally from

19861

Aronson and Its Progeny

sis of the demand futility issue in Tabas illustrates the significance
of the presumption of propriety attaching to the board's actions
under the business judgment rule. Viewed collectively, the decisions
in Aronson, Pogostin, Kaufman and Tabas suggest that shareholders derivatively challenging the board's approval of compensation
agreements entered into with corporate managers will frequently encounter great difficulty in establishing demand futility. '
Miscellaneous
In Allison on Behalf of G.M.C. v. General Motors Corp., 82 a
General Motors shareholder filed a derivative action against General
Motors and six present and former directors alleging violations of
the Racketeer Influence Act and the Corrupt Organizations Act. The
plaintiff charged the defendants with knowingly producing and selling cars with defective braking systems, concealing the defects, and
filing false disclosures with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).' s s The complaint also stated claims based
upon fraud, mismanagement, and breach of fiduciary duties. 8 4 Although a demand letter was sent prior to initiation of the derviative
action, the court was nevertheless required to resolve a claim of demand futility. 85 The shareholder premised demand futility upon the
following grounds: (1) failure of the General Motors Board to act
after the plaintiff had directed letters to the board demanding that
it undertake action, (2) failure of the board to act on behalf of the
corporation despite knowledge of the wrongdoing for a period of
four years, (3) participation of former and present board members
in the alleged wrongs, (4) conclusions that the board members would
not file suit against themselves, and (5) charges that individual defendants dominated the board.' s 6
In concluding that none of these asserted grounds were sufficient to establish demand futility, the Allison court relied upon federal case law, but noted that application of the Aronson test would
yield the same result. 8 7 The plaintiff's allegations were deemed inpurchasing its shares above market price. Id. Also, there were allegations that the
directors reached agreement without "meaningful negotiations" in a "hastily called
telephone meeting." Id.
181. As noted in the Pogostin case, directors' decisions concerning the consideration for directors' and officers' stock options are conclusive in the absence of "actual
fraud." 480 A.2d at 625.
182. 604 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Del. 1985).
183. Id at 1110.

184. Id.

185. Id. at 1110-16. The court concluded that while the plaintiff's letter met the
requirements for constituting a proper demand, the filing of the suit two and one half
months after the demand was premature because the board was not given adequate

time to respond to the demand. Id. at 1117-19.
186. Id. at 1113-16.
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sufficient for many of the same reasons highlighted in other cases
which applied the Aronson demand test. The plaintiff, while asserting that demand futility was established by defendants' participation in the wrongs, failed to allege with particularity the directors'
"participation, self-dealing, bias, bad faith, or corrupt motive ... ."188 While claiming individual defendants controlled the

board, no factual allegations were presented to substantiate this
conclusion. 189 The Allison court rejected the notion that demand futility was established simply because the board knew of a wrong to
the corporation and refused to institute suit to redress it.190
The Allison court reaffirmed the notion that the demand requirement is a substantive right.1 91 Thus, it is unlikely that a shareholder can avoid Delaware's stringent demand requirements by initiating the action in a federal forum. 1s2 In conclusion, the Allison
opinion suggests that courts will refuse to readily infer that a director's independence has been forfeited through alleged domination or
control. Courts will strictly enforce the requirement that a plaintiff
allege particularized facts showing the existence of relationships rendering the board powerless to act.
CONCLUSIONS

It is necessary to reiterate the policies underlying the demand
requirement and to consider the effects of derivative litigation upon
management and corporate resources when assessing Aronson's
adoption of the business judgment rule as a guide to demand futility. The demand requirement assures that the board of directors will
have the opportunity to review the merits of proposed derivative litigation, to determine whether the claims represent bona fide wrongs
against the corporation, and to decide whether those wrongs are best
remedied through either the corporation's undertaking of litigation
or the corporation's resorting to intracorporate actions. 9 8 By virtue
of the demand requirement, the board is granted the first opportunity to sponsor the lawsuit and to thereby use corporate resources to
redress a wrong done to the business entity.19" In view of the significant benefits to judicial and corporate economy derived from the de187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1114.
1115.
1114.
1115.

192. See id. at 1115-16. This conclusion was predicted in an early commentary

on Aronson. Block & Prussin, Termination of Derivative Actions Against Directors
on Business Judgment Grounds:From Zapata to Aronson, 39 Bus. LAW. 1503, 1512

(1984).
193. The Demand and Standing Requirement, supra note 7, a. 171-72. See
generally cases cited in note 7 supra.
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mand requirement, courts should strictly enforce the requirement.""5
The contours of demand futility should encompass situations where
the board cannot objectively act on the demand or where the board
has previously expressed in clear terms its opposition to the proposed derviative action.'" 6
Beneficial Aspects of the Aronson Demand Requirement
Initially it is noted that the Delaware Supreme Court's adoption
of the business judgment rule as a guide to demand futility is laudable on at least two counts. First, judicial applications of the reasonable doubt standard of proof to the facts of Aronson, and in the demand cases following in Aronson's wake, generally suggest that the
shareholder will not be readily excused from making demand upon
the board. The Aronson court's apparently rigorous standard for demand could be relaxed through future judicial application and also
by subsequent developments in Delaware's business judgment rule.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Aronson decision is
the limitation it imposes on the power of courts to independently
determine whether a shareholder can maintain a derivative action.
To the extent that Aronson is. interpreted as mandating a rigorous
demand requirement, it is to be hailed as a fortunate sequel to
Zapata. Zapata was significant in its recognition of the power of a
board committee, composed of one or more independent directors,
to dismiss a derivative action directed against a majority of the
board members.'9 7 The Zapata court sought to remedy perceived directorial bias by proclaiming that when demand futility is present a
court, subsequently reviewing the committee's motion for dismissal
of a derivative action against board members, should independently
determine whether the derivative lawsuit should be continued.' 8
Zapata, therefore, resulted in an inextricable linking of the demand
194. See Abrams v. Mayflower Investors, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 361, 369 (N.D. Ill.
1974).
195. Two standards for demand futility seem to capture the spirit and purposes
of the demand requirement. First, demand can be required whenever there is a possibility that it could result in the board's remedial action. The Demand and Standing
Requirement, supra note 7, at 173. See also Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 786 (1982)
(demand should be required if "it would be likely to prod them [directors] to correct
a wrong."). Alternatively demand could be required whenever "there is a reasonable

possibility that it would positively affect the board's behavior." PRINCIPLES OF CORPO-

§ 7.03 comment e (Discussion
Draft No. 1, 1985). The comments accompanying the American Law Institute's recent
draft on rules of corporate governance suggest that the demand standard proposed in
Lewis is inadequate because it "assumes that there is a-wrong to be corrected." Id. at
RATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND REcOMMENDATIONS

comment d. The draft continues: "The director's antagonism to an action may well be
justified and flow from a sound judgment that the action is either not meritious or
would otherwise subject the corporation to serious injury." Id.
196. See Comment, supra note 7, at 173-82.
197. See Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 786.
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requirement with the power of the board to terminate a derivative
action under the business judgment rule.19 ' In situations when the
shareholder is required to make a demand, the business judgment
rule shelters from judicial review the board's subsequent decision to
recommend dismissal. 00 Under Zapata's demand futility-strict scrutiny approach, expansion of the concept of demand futility reduces
the frequency with which board motions for termination of derivative litigation will be insulated from judicial review. 0 1
The Zapata court's linking of the demand requirement with the
level of judicial scrutiny applicable to a board's decision to terminate a derivative action is unfortunate. An important purpose underlying the demand requirement is to grant the corporation an initial opportunity to undertake litigation proposed by the
shareholder.2 0 2 Zapata's demand futility-strict scrutiny procedure

incorrectly assumes that whenever demand futility is present, a
board's decision to forego the derivative litigation is suspect. 03
While demand futility will generally be premised upon allegations
that directors have engaged in injurious acts to the corporation, or
that a wrongdoer controls the director,2s0 demand could also be
deemed futile when the board has in good faith previously expressed
its opposition to the shareholder's lawsuit which it views as inimical
to the corporation's best interest.20 5 If the shareholder was excused
from making demand in such a setting, Zapata would nevertheless
subject the board's good faith motion for termination of the lawsuit
198. Id. at 779-80. See generally supra note 44.
199. By virtue of Zapata, business judgment rule protection for the board's decision to terminate a derivative suit is only afforded when demand has been required.
430 A.2d at 784 n.10.
200. Id. In explaining the premise underlying Zapata's demand futility-strict
scrutiny approach, one author has noted: "The court in Zapata may have assumed
that the directors can be expected to rise above the pressures of structural bias when
a demand is required because the majority is not affiliated with the cause of action."
Cox, supra note 10, at 1009.
201. See 473 A.2d at 813.
202. See Reilly Mort. Group v. Mt. Vernon Say. & Loan Ass'n, 568 F. Supp.
1067, 1075 (E.D. Va. 1983); see The Demand and Standing Requirement, supra note
7, at 172.
203. A shareholder may nevertheless file a derivative law suit after the board
has refused a demand and assert his standing to bring the action suit by demonstrating the wrongfulness of the directors' decision. 430 A.2d at 784 n.12. Although the
requirement that a shareholder first demand action from the board does not prevent
the shareholder from initiating litigation after a refusal by the board, Aronson nevertheless insures that the directors' motion for dismissal will frequently be successful
because of business judgment protection. See infra notes 207-09 and accompanying
text.
204. See generally supra notes 107-39 and accompanying text. The court in
McKee v. Rogers, 18 Del. Ch. 81, 156 A. 191, 195 (1931), may suggest that demand
futility is only established when it is demonstrated that the board is incapable of
acting in "good faith."
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to its second tier judicial scrutiny.oe
The Aronson decision curtails the potential expansion of
Zapata's second tier scrutiny by formulating a rigorous approach to
the demand requirement. 0 7 The Aronson test for demand futility
does not inquire about whether the board might act on the demand,
but merely determines whether a reasonable doubt is created about
the applicability of the business rule to a majority of the directors. 08
By virtue of this rigid standard for demand futility, Aronson assures
that judicial review of the board's termination of a derivative action
will only occur when it appears that a majority of the directors have
been participating in wrongdoing and, therefore, they were not acting in good faith on the demand.20°
Defects in the Aronson Demand Standard
While Aronson reflects a positive development in Delaware corporate law by adopting an ostensibly expansive interpretation of the
demand requirement, its erroneous linking of the demand requirement with the business judgment rule produces a series of potentially unfortunate consequences. As a precursor to examining these
defective aspects of the Aronson test, it is valuable to reiterate the
essential components of the demand futility test articulated in the
decision.
In determining whether or not the derivative litigant has established demand futility, Aronson concludes that the focal point of
concern is the board's approval of the challenged transaction. Specifically, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged
particularized facts which create a reasonable doubt concerning the
applicability of the business judgment rule to a majority of the
board members in their approval of the challenged transactions.210
This requires initially an inquiry into the independence and disin205. See The Demand and Standing Requirement, supra note 7, at 180-81. Aronson's apparent requirement that a demand be made in settings where the board
has previously expressed hostility to the lawsuit may be inconsequential for two rea-

sons. First, in the vast majority of cases, the shareholder's assertion of demand futility is not premised on previous expressions of the board's opposition to the lawsuit,
but is premised instead upon charges that the board is engaged in wrongdoing or
controlled by a wrongdoer. Secondly, the demand requirement can easily be fulfilled
by the shareholder. See The Demand and Standing Requirement, supra note 7 at
172.
206. See Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 787.
207. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 808.
208. Id.
209. Aronson's application of the business judgment rule to demand futility resembles the First Circuit's approach set forth in the case of In re Kauffman Mutual
Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973). The court in

Kauffman concluded that in order to properly claim demand futility, the shareholder
must "demonstrate why the directors are incapable of doing their duty." Id. at 263.
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terestedness of the directors in approving the transaction. 1 Secondly, the court must ascertain whether or not a reasonable doubt
has been raised concerning the directors' exercise of business judgment in approving the transaction. 212
Three criticisms can be leveled at Aronson's adoption of business judgment as an analytical framework for resolutions of demand
futility. The first defect in the Aronson test arises from its second
prong inquiry concerning business judgment. 213 As previously suggested in this article, demand undoubtedly should be deemed futile
when directors are engaged in transactions in which their loyalty to
the corporation has been compromised. Directors are rendered incapable of acting on the demand when they are engaged in self-dealing, are knowing participants in fraud, or are controlled by a wrong' Similarly,
doer.214
directors are incapable of acting on demand when
apparent conflicts of interest are present as in the Good or Moran
settings.
A director should not, however, be denied an opportunity to
rectify an injury that arose not from his attempt at self-aggrandizement or knowing participation in fraud, but from his failure to exercise due care.' 16 Directors can still be expected to respond with remedial action in such a setting. 1 6 Unfortunately, the second prong
of the Aronson test suggests that demand could alternatively be excused because a reasonable doubt has been established concerning
the directors' exercise of due care in approving the transaction. Van
Gorkom's pronouncements concerning informed and deliberate judgments indicated that demand futility might be premised upon allegations that the directors who approved a major corporate transaction failed to consult with experts or deliberated for an inordinately
short period of time. The Tabas case illustrates such a result. In
concluding that the plaintiff established a reasonable doubt concerning the directors' independence and business judgment in approving
the stock purchase, the court in part relied upon allegations "that
the directors did not act on an informed basis and approved a transaction 'partly absent any meaningful negotiations' at a hastily called
telephone meeting.'

21 7

Also, the court observed that the directors

21
did not have advance notice of the meeting. 8
One limiting factor on this deficiency in the Aronson test is that

210. 473 A.2d at 814.
211. Id.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id.
Id.
See The Demand and Standing Requirement, supra note 7, at 174, 179-80.
Id. at 178.

216. Id. at 178-79.
217. 608 F. Supp. at 768.

218. Id. at 769.
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a shareholder, at the time of filing a derivative action, generally will
not have detailed information concerning a board's deliberations
and directors' procedures in approving a challenged transaction."'
Thus, the plaintiff would frequently be incapable of alleging particularized facts indicating that a majority of the board had failed to use
requisite care. One setting in which the plaintiff would have such
access to detailed information concerning the board's deliberations
is when the shareholder bringing the derivative action is also a
member of the board of directors. The Moran case illustrated such a
scenario because the plaintiff served on the Household board and
was also the Chairman of the Dyson-Kissner-Moran Corporation,
the largest single shareholder in Household."' The inadequacy of
the business judgment rule as a guide to demand futility is manifest.
Even though a director may not be able to claim protection under
the business judgment rule because of a failure to exercise requisite
care in approving a challenged transaction, the underlying purposes
of the demand requirement suggest that demand should neverthe221
less be required.
A second criticism of the Aronson test is that it could require
demand in settings where it would constitute a formalistic and
meaningless act. When the board has clearly manifested its hostility
to the proposed derivative action, requiring demand does not further the underlying purposes of the demand requirement. 2 Unfortunately, if demand was regarded as futile in such a setting, Zapata
would dictate that a board's subsequent motion to terminate the derivative action would not be subject to the protection of the business
judgment rule. 2 8
A third deficiency in the Aronson test is perceived in the light
of recent developments in the jurisprudence of the Delaware business judgment rule. The Van Gorkom, Unocal, and Moran decisions
indicate that the contours of the Delaware business judgment rule
may be in a state of flux. The conclusions of the Delaware Supreme
Court in Van Gorkom suggest that changes can be Wrought in business judgment protection through stringent judicial interpretations
of the essential elements of the business judgment rule. In particular, the rule is always subject to more rigorous interpretation based
upon the judiciary's evolving views concerning the levels of directo219. Plaintiffs are not afforded the opportunity to conduct discovery for purposes of substantiating allegations of demand futility. Kauffman v. Belmont, 479 A.2d
282, 289 (Del. Ch. 1983).
220. Moran v. Household Int'l, slip. op. No. 37, 1985 (Del. Nov. 19, 1985) (available on lexis).
221. See The Demand and Standing Requirement, supra note 7, at 178-79.

222. Id. at 178. For a discussion of the reason why this aspect of the test may
constitute an insignificant defect, see the discussion in note 205 supra.
223. See 473 A.2d at 787.
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rial activity deemed necessary to support a conclusion that a board's
decision was both informed and diligent. 24 In contrast, the Moran
and Unocal decisions indicate that the parameters of the business
judgment rule are subject to refinement through decisions addressing the rule's applicability to new and unique board transactions. As
the court noted in another context in the Unocal decision: "However, our corporate law is not static. It must grow and develop in
response to, indeed in anticipation of, evolving concepts and
needs, '226 The holdings of Moran and Unocal are encouraging because they affirmed that board adoptions of anti-takeover devices
are subject to the protection of the business judgment rule. 22 ' Nevertheless, the decisions, when viewed in conjunction with Van
Gorkom, suggest that while the concept of the business judgment
rule may be a fixed star in the constellation of Delaware corporate
law, its applicational scope is subject to change.
In view of the potential evolution in Delaware's business judgment rule, serious questions are raised concerning the suitability of
the Aronson business judgment test for demand futility. The linking
of the demand requirement with the business judgment rule indicates that subsequent judicial limitations on business judgment protection could broaden the scope of demand futility.227 The benefits
forthcoming from the demand requirement would be more readily
secured by simply requiring demand to be made whenever the board
is capable of acting on demand and has not previously expressed its
hostility to the proposed action.22 8 Subjecting the demand requirement to fluctuations in the Delaware business judgment rule could
result in demand being deemed futile where a demand could serve a
229
useful purpose.
Review of the most recent cases applying the Aronson demand
224. See generally Emerson, The Director as Corporate Legal Monitor: Environmental Legislation and Pandora'sBox, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 593, 601, 610-11
(1985).
225. 493 A.2d at 957.
226. The applicability of the business judgment rule to the board's implementation of defensive devices to frustrate hostile takeover attempts has engendered significant disagreement among commentators. Compare Easterbrook and Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733 (1984)
(rejecting the notion that anti-takeover measures should be protected by the business
judgment rule) with Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW.
101, 131 (business judgment rule is applicable to takeovers).
227. The suggestion of this article that Van Gorkom reflects a departure from
the Delaware jurisprudence of business judgment is certainly subject to debate. Compare Fischel, supra note 78, at 1454-55 (noting Delaware's "rich and stable body of
precedents" but concluding that Van Gorkom is "one of the worst decisions in the
history of corporate law") with PracticalTips on Life in the Boardroom, supra note
79, at 4 ("Van Gorkom . . .can be fitted [and I predict later will be fitted] into the
mainstream of business judgment rule jurisprudence.")
228. See The Demand and Standing Requirement, supra note 7, at 181.
229. See text accompanying notes 215-16 supra.
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test suggests that the potential problems herein discussed are yet to
be realized. The decisions in Kaufman, Allison, and Pogostin indicate that Aronson has placed a difficult burden on the shareholder
seeking to establish demand futility. The conclusions of demand futility in Good and Moran comport with the general guidelines for
applications of the demand requirement articulated herein. Each of
these two cases involved a factual setting in which a strong possibility existed that a conflict of interests impaired the directors' abilities to objectively assess the merits of the demand. The outcome in
Tabas is somewhat troubling because of the court's apparent premising of demand futility on grounds that the board may have failed
to exercise requisite care in approving the transaction."30 The factual
setting portrayed by the complaint suggested, however, the board's
approval of the buy out agreement was not merely the product of
gross negligence, but reflected a conscious decision to aid the former
president in a self-serving transaction at corporate expense. 3 1
The issue of demand futility, as addressed by the court in Aronson, represents one small aspect of the much greater issue of the
degree of independence that the major corporation should enjoy as
an economic and social force in our society."2 The decision may disturb those who perceive corporate management as a group wielding
inordinate power without sufficient accountability to shareholders or
to society, but Aronson should reflect a mixed blessing in the development of Delaware's substantive law governing derivative actions.
Zapata erroneously concluded that reference to whether demand
was required initially determines the level of judicial scrutiny that
should be applied to a board's decision to seek termination of a de-.
rivative action. In Aronson the court has incorrectly perceived the
relationship of the demand requirement and business judgment protection for the transaction challenged in a derivative action. Aronson, however, is a welcome development to the extent that, through
rigorous application of the demand requirement, it curtails the impact of Zapata's second tier strict scrutiny of board decisions to
terminate.

230. 608 F. Supp. at 768-69.
231. See id. at 768.
232. The Aronson court recognized this point. 473 A.2d at 811 n.6. For exam-

ples of the general debate over corporate autonomy and the issue of whether there is
a need for reform in corporate governance compare Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982) (defending sufficiency of present corporate structure) with Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporations:Officers, Directors, and Accountants 63 CAUF. L. REV. 375 (1975)
(proposing reforms in corporate law).

